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THE NEW AWAKENING: JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE*
by
The Honorable William Wayne Justice**

I.
HEN I was a law student at the University of Texas, it was not
uncommon for our professors to share with us their perceptions
and opinions of how the form and the substance of the law would
evolve in future years. Professors relished their frequent success in predicting the outcome of pending Supreme Court cases. In addition, most professors vociferously expounded their strongly held opinions concerning which
particular course the law in their field would and should pursue. At the
time, I was new to the formal study of law and somewhat overwhelmed by
its intricacies and vastness. Because I was almost convinced that the law
had a will of its own, I listened to their predictions with some degree of
skepticism.
As it turned out, however, many of those professors possessed remarkable
foresight, and their comments often proved portentous. For instance, the
views of Dean McCormick, who wrote the first edition of McCormick on
Evidence1 in 1954, provided much of the framework for the promulgation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. In addition, Professor Kenneth C. Davis,
who has authored the definitive administrative law treatise since 1958,2 laid
the scholarly groundwork for the explosive growth of administrative law.
In addition to being skeptical about these professors' insights into the future, I was never really sure of what use the predictions could be. After all,
as a law student, wasn't my task simply to learn what the law was, or at least
how to research the law to determine what the law probably was? As soon
as I began to practice law with my father, however, I realized that a lawyer's
duty as an advocate requires him or her not only to contemplate, but actually to participate in the development of the law. A lawyer's job is made
much easier if he or she has some understanding of the inclinations of the
judges before whom the lawyer practices, and of the direction in which institutional forces are moving legal doctrine in a particular field. This understanding is equally necessary for both proponents and detractors of the
* This Article is a revised and annotated version of the twelfth Roy R. Ray Lecture,
delivered at Southern Methodist University School of Law on March 29, 1989.
** Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
1.

C.

MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

2. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1958).

(1954).
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substantive developments of legal doctrine. A proponent may more readily
prevail if his or her argument is structured in a way that advances the trend,
while a detractor may insulate an otherwise unpopular substantive position
in the rhetoric of the day, thereby ensuring that it is at least considered
seriously.
I am not thrusting myself into the company of noted scholars such as
Dean McCormick and Professor Davis. However, giving consideration to
the general public perception-whether just or not-that I am a liberal, activist judge, I am perhaps qualified to express an opinion to you today regarding the future of activism in this age of conservative judges.
It may be a matter of surprise to you that, recently, I have been reading
and considering the writings and decisions of particularly notable conservative judges and commentators. My real interest in their work began when I
realized that one school of the faction-ridden conservative movement, the
libertarians, is frankly relying upon natural law as the basis for advancing its
pronouncements. Since I have been interested in natural law for a number
of years, I began to delve considerably deeper; and by reason of my somewhat unstructured studies, I am now emboldened to predict, in this undeniably conservative era, the future course of certain facets of constitutional law.
As employed by judges and legal scholars, natural law is an expression of
the point of intersection between law and morals. 3 Natural law mediates
between a moral sphere, which limits the powers of government, and the
realm of law proper. 4 Moral concepts by their nature are subject to competing theories that require interpretation. The text of the Constitution, which
is silent on the matter of how to define or interpret its principles, traditionally has been supplemented through interpretive techniques like the natural
rights methodology. Used in this way, natural law itself may be described as
contentless, merely providing a means for scholars to express constitutional
values.
While it would seem logical to find the constitutional basis of rights derived from natural law in the ninth amendment, which refers to rights not
enumerated in the Constitution, or in the privileges and immunities clauses
of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, this has not been the case. For
the most part, the language of natural law provides the basis for interpreting
the enumerated rights in the Constitution and their concomitant moral concepts, specifically, free speech, free press, and free exercise of religion in the
first amendment; the ban against cruel and unusual punishment in the eighth
amendment; the equal protection of the laws in the fourteenth amendment;
and due process regarding deprivations of life, liberty, and property in the
5
fifth and fourteenth amendments.
3. McCauliff, Constitutional Jurisprudence of History and Natural Law. Complementary
or Rival Modes of Discourse?, 24 CAL. W.L. REv. 287, 289-90 (1988).

4. Id.
5. The use of natural law principles has been pervasive in constitutional law-making.
The Court, invoking natural law to constitutionalize the common law standard of beyond a
reasonable doubt in criminal proceedings, stated:
It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard
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Throughout our legal history theorists have deeply probed the flaws in
natural rights theory. It behooves attorneys, now, to recollect the many uses
of natural rights theories and to develop cogent criticisms of their use. For
as I have stated, I believe that we are entering an era when these ideas will
reappear in service of conservative ideology, and that property rights and
economic interests will emerge as sacrosanct.
In making my predictions, I am cognizant that many judges of conservative disposition would deny the existence of any political component in their
decisions. Indeed, all judges, including myself, would make the same protestation. But Judge Skelly Wright may have expressed the actualities, when he
said: "The connection between a mere consistent pattern of results and a
political program lies in the decision maker's mind and thus is impossible to
6
bring to light other than circumstantially."
If, then, I make statements indicating the probability of a conservative
program in the making, I do not mean a program of deliberately formed
goals. Instead, the agenda will probably develop as a "mere consistent pattern of results," and the proponents of the results undoubtedly will announce them as being derived from neutral principles of interpretation. But
all of these professedly neutral principles, as espoused by conservative scholars and judges, lead inevitably to the conclusion that property rights and
economic interests are virtually inviolate. This is not an inconsiderable circumstance, in my opinion, in reaching the conclusion that a political program exists, even if its presence is unrecognized or disaffirmed by its
proponents. I should point out, finally, that, in making these introductory
remarks, I am, for the most part, paralleling the arguments made by conservative critics of the Warren Court.
II.
The broader context of these remarks will be, as with so much legal commentary presently, the constraints on legitimate interpretation of the Constitution. 7 We may regard the elucidation of such interpretive inhibitions as
only the rightful task of judicial authorities, or pragmatically, we may consider only the need for judges to render interpretations that the public perceives as valid.8 In either case, the ensuing remarks are firmly planted in
of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going
about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge
him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his
guilt with utmost certainty.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
6. Wright, The Judicial Right and the Rhetoric of Restraint: A Defense of Judicial Activism in an Age of Conservative Judges, 14 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 487, 501 (1987). Much of
what follows in this Article was inspired by Judge Wright's insightful analysis of contemporary
judicial activism.
7. Brennan, My Encounters with the Constitution, THE JUDGE'S JOURNAL, Summer
1987, at 8.
8. Id.
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the context of the interpretive, rather than the noninterpretive, tradition of
legal commentary.
If, as Judge Wright believed, judges find "repositories of value" outside
themselves and their theories of political morality to which they can turn to
decide hard cases, we must ask why repositories such as tradition and consensus recur, despite shifting political agendas and changing political climates. One nearly universal repository, that of natural or fundamental
rights, promises to provide the basis for significant law-making in the future,
precisely because it is the shared rhetorical posture of various conservative
lawmakers and commentators.
If these remarks smack of value skepticism, my response must be that
doubt is useful in any age, particularly when strict notions about the right
ordering of society announce themselves as neutral principles of interpretation. For the moment, allow me to place us at the rhetorical crossroad that I
will term fundamental rights. As the Supreme Court has said, this term has
replaced the term natural rights.9 At this mental juncture, we meet advocates of the original intent posture, proponents of traditional or consensus
values, and the law and economics school. All suffer nausea in response to
the value-suffused law-making that has gone before; all have untroubled confidence in their ability to look back to a bygone day to find truth; and all
share an innately conservative view of personal liberty. Why do they all find
repose in the concept of fundamental rights? The answer is, their interpretive stance is backward-looking; and, looking back into the far-distant past,
they find support for their abstractions concerning fundamental rights.
Looking forward, they see a popular majority that shares their constricted
view of personal liberties, and that welcomes their assurances of economic
liberty. These two visions may well be distorted, as I will seek to show.
Hence, my assumed posture of skepticism.
The search for fundamental rights begins with the legal scholar's quest for
tradition. But where must the scholar seek it and from whom? The framers
were heirs to a rich natural law tradition of their own, one very different
from that evoked in their names. Modern Americans have a harder time. In
this regard, John Hart Ely cogently asked: "Is Henry David Thoreau an
invocable part of American tradition? John Brown? John Calhoun? Jesus
Christ?" 10
In seventeenth century England, natural law was legally supreme, unwritten, drawing its content from enactments, custom, usage, and reason; moreover, it was judicially enforceable. I I Natural law's foundations in reason
were captured in that society's legal concept of common law.' 2 The tradition of natural law survived even the encroachments of an eighteenth century Parliament that was, in most respects, legally supreme. For example, in
9.
10.
11.
tionary
12.

Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1944).
Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 39 (1978).
Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American RevoluThought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 850 (1978).
Id. at 853 n.41.
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1766, in response to a crisis in parliament concerning taxation without representation, Lord Camden was moved to declare the act: "illegal, absolutely
illegal, contrary to the fundamental laws of nature, contrary to the fundamental laws of this constitution ... [a] constitution grounded on the external
13
and immutable laws of nature."'
The framers of our Constitution were greatly influenced by Blackstone
and Locke. Indeed, the most often cited passage of Blackstone's Commentaries was: "[T]he law of nature is of course superior in obligation to all others
... . No human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this."' 14 Locke's
concepts of life, liberty, and estate gained lasting importance, through the
enshrinement of these principles in the Declaration of Independence-itself
a triumph of natural law principles. 15 The declaration was "submitted to a
candid world." It was an appeal for recognition of the right to revolt,
couched in the catch-phrases of the day, which evoked perceived universal
human truths. Both the writings of Locke, on which it was modeled, and
the declaration itself were documents of revolution, premised on the English
intellectual tradition that Parliament's authority was legally limited by an
6
unwritten constitution incorporating natural law.'
Both stood for the proposition that natural rights were the protected arsenal of the people, to be wielded, if necessary, against tyrannical governments.
When the written Constitution crystallized a part of the unwritten law,17 the
judiciary continued to ascertain fundamental law in other contexts and gave
it constitutional significance. Natural law came to be argued to courts as a
vindication of the rights of an individual over the tyranny of government, in
the manner it was argued to the world as a substantiation of the rights of the
colonists over the tyranny of Britain.' 8 The strand of natural law through
the fabric of legal history does not end with the framers. Throughout constitutional history, judicially enforceable moral principles, even those not explicitly stated in the Constitution, have played a vital role in law-making.
In Calder v. Bull 19 Justice Chase invoked "the general principles of law
and reason," said to constrain legislators even in the absence of explicit constitutional prohibitions. 20 The basis of this position lies both in the framers'
belief that moral rights bind popular governments and in the Constitution
itself, which "secures" but does not confer rights. 2 1 These concepts found
purest expression in the ninth amendment, which calls upon interpreters of
the Constitution not to "deny or disparage" the existence of rights not stated
explicitly in the Constitution.
The history of the concept of natural law in legal argument supports the
13.
(1813),
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Speech by Lord Camden (Feb. 10, 1766), reprinted in 16 PARL. HIST. ENG. 178
quoted in Grey, supra note 11, at 857.
Grey, supra note II, at 858.
Id. at 860.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 869.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
Id. at 388.
S. MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT v. THE CONSTITUTION 45 (1987).
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proposition that the concept is inherently vague and called on to support
myriad assertions of differing merit. As Justice Iredell said in Calder v. Bull,
in concurrence: "The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and purest men have differed upon the subject .... -22 In
colonial times, natural law was invoked to support the right to brew beer at
home. 23 In 1873 Justice Bradley invoked divine law as a justification for
denying a woman the right to practice law: "[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective
spheres and destinies of man and woman .... *24 During its long usage in
legal and political scholarship, natural law has been widely invoked, including application in favor of and against slavery, 25 and to "prove" the inferiority of blacks. 26 Both the 1850 Kentucky Constitution and the 1857
Kansas Constitution declared the right to own slaves "before and higher
' 27
than any constitutional sanction.
During the Civil War, the use of natural law in defense of human equality
came to the fore. Abraham Lincoln described the central proposition of the
Declaration of Independence as "an abstract truth applicable to all men and
all times."' 28 Indeed, the very foundation of Lincoln's assertions was the
principle that the competing claims of slaves and slave traders were morally
distinguishable, 29 an idea that has been lost in the flurry of critical material
on the content of fundamental rights. To the extent that modern questions
are posed in terms of fundamental rights, their determination only appears
to have less weight than the question of slavery. The widespread application
of the term fundamental rights, as well as the method of balancing competing interests, have served to alter the moral content of natural law. The
greatest alteration of that content has occurred through the application of
these principles to property rights and economic interests.
After the Civil War, the development of "substantive due process," linked
to the fifth and fourteenth amendments, carried on the tradition of natural
law as a rationale for judicially protected economic liberties.30 The doctrine
of substantive due process was developed for this purpose. It is identified
most closely with the case of Lochner v. New York. 3 1 In Lochner the Court
struck down a New York statute limiting the working hours of bakery employees as an abridgement of liberty of contract. 32 Lochner has been described as emblematic of an era of judicial decisionmaking that brought into
high relief implied limits on governmental authorities. At the core of this
22.
23.
24.
(1873)).
25.
26.
27.
28.
at 47.
29.
30.
31.
32.

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 398 (Iredell, J., concurring).
Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
Ely, supra note 10, at 28 n.101 (citing Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
Id.
Id.
Id.
Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address, as quoted in S. MACEDO, supra note 21,
S. MACEDO, supra note 21, at 47.
Id.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Id. at 57-58.
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theoretical posture was the notion that state or federal governments had no
power to act outside rightful jurisdiction so as to intrude upon the "natural
rights" reserved to people within the private domain. 33 During the period,
the Supreme Court was more willing than it has ever been in other times to
invalidate economic regulations pursuant to the due process clause. 34 In
Lochner the Court rejected New York's claim that its sixty-hour limit on
bakery employees' work week was significantly and directly related to the
promotion of employee health. 35 The Court's finding seemingly discredited
significant evidence that established risks to the health and welfare of
employees.
This analysis continued to appear in the Court's decisions. In Adkins v.
Children's Hospita3 6 the Court struck minimum wage laws for women on
the grounds that governmental wage regulation was needed only in limited
categories of employment. 37 In these cases, the Court advanced the notion
that government exists to advance general public welfare and total public
good. 38 Under this theory any statute that imposed burdens on individuals
or corporations, in order to redistribute resources and thus benefit some persons at the expense of others, was invalid because it exceeded the scope of
legislative authority. 39 Such laws were seen to violate natural rights of property and contract, which were viewed as the core of the domain of private
rights. Corrective justice thereby became the protected realm of the
judiciary.
The judicial philosophy reflected in Lochner provides two distinct tools of
interpretation to modern judicial conservatives. Not only does it stand for
the proposition that economic liberties are inviolate, but it also supports the
notion that the courts possess the proper authority to balance competing
claims of right. The latter concept provides the underpinning for a seemingly inconsistent constriction of personal liberties that fits hand-in-glove
with a laissez-faire economic agenda.
The fate of Lochnerian judicial philosophy is instructive in these times of
its rebirth. The model supported by Lochner contained an internal tension-the private right versus public use controversy. Conceivably, a court
could uphold a challenge to an act in the general public welfare under the
strictures of Lochner. This is precisely the problem posed in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon.40 In Pennsylvania Coal a homeowner sought an injunction against underground coal mining that would damage his property. His
claim was founded on a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting such mining. It
was argued that the presence of a preexisting deed granting the right to mine
rendered the statute an infringement on subsistent rights to property and
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Id. § 8-2, at 568.
Id. § 8-3, at 569.
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
Id. at 546-48.
L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 8-4, at 571.
Id. § 8-4, at 571.

40. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).

§ 8-1, at 560 (2d ed. 1988).
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contract. The Court majority found for the coal company, because the company had not been compensated for the taking of its property. 4 1 Under the
court's reasoning, eminent domain became a procedural substitute for substantive guarantees of contractual autonomy, thus blurring the distinction
between private and public purposes that Lochner had delineated.
The demise of Lochner is commonly traced to the Supreme Court's approval of the New Deal economic legislation, including minimum wage legislation, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations Act,
and the Agricultural Adjustment Act. 42 By its own terms, Lochner allowed
for the prospect that legislative acts advancing the general public welfare
could be upheld against claims of private rights. The internal tension of this
interpretive model-between private right and public use-came to a head
as the Court confronted the economic crises of the Depression.
Professor Tribe postulates three possible directions, post Lochner, that the
Court could have taken in the area of economic rights: (1) overt acceptance
of economic legislation as political law-making, with control through monitoring of the political process; (2) all-out skepticism of the judicial competence to criticize such legislation; or (3) substantive interpretation, based on
the theory that legislation can protect basic human freedoms. 43 In Tribe's
view, had the Court accepted the second alternative in economic law-making, that is, the path of skepticism, the result would have been "wholesale
abdication to the political process, [and] . . . insensitiv[ity] to matters of
institutional competence and democratic legitimacy."'44 Modern originalists,
majoritarians, and law and economics adherents nonetheless trace their origins to this strain of judicial philosophy.
The Warren Court, though, chose the third model of substantive review
toward the end of protecting basic human freedoms. At the heart of many of
the pronouncements of the Warren Court were natural law concepts.
Among its holdings in the area of equal protection, and outside of it, the
Court struck down durational residence requirements for welfare recipients,
held poll taxes to be unconstitutional, applied a reasonable doubt standard to
juvenile delinquency proceedings, and required a hearing before termination
of welfare.4 5 As Judge Wright has characterized it, the Warren Court activism was "judging in service of conscience." 46
The founding of many Warren Court determinations in the principles of
natural law may seem right to those who believe these decisions were rendered in service of conscience. The Court's value-laden decision in Roe v.
41. Id. at 415.
42. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Agricultural Adjustment Act); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (Fair Labor Standards Act); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (National Labor Relations Act); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (minimum wage).
43. L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 8-7, at 583.
44. Id. § 8-7, at 585.
45. Cohen, Justices Black and Douglas and the "Natural Law-Due-Process Formula"Some Fragments of Intellectual History, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 381, 394-95 n.75 (1987).
46. Wright, supra note 6, at 489.
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Wade47 stood for the principle that a woman's right to choose an abortion
was so important, or so fundamental, that our society could not permit it to
be infringed legislatively. 48 The Court's opinion in Lochner was borne on
the same reasoning, with the substitution of the right to contract. Employing the same concept, and assuming the posture of natural rights advocates,
49
can we find a principled way of approving Brown v. Board of Education
while disapproving Lochner? If the two cannot be distinguished on principle
by natural rights advocates, we must concede a flaw in the methodology.
Once again, I will suggest that it behooves advocates to distinguish these
concepts, since Lochnerian economic rights are in the ascendancy in the
present day.
It may still be declared, as Alexander Bickel has said, that "[t]he Court is
'an institution charged with the evolution and application of society's fundamental principles,' and its task, accordingly, is 'to define values and proclaim
principles.' -50 But the Court has virtually discontinued the declaration of
fundamental rights for the protection of human freedoms. In this regard,
many of the Court's opinions since the Warren years are, at best, uneven
and, collectively, a record of retrenchment. Both the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have retreated from the commitment to personal liberties that characterized the opinions of the 1950s and 60s. The Burger Court emblemized,
if anything, the belief that the judicial system should restrain its encroachment into majoritarian political decisions as much as possible, but, when
necessary, should restrain the federal majoritarian branches from intruding
into state and local political autonomy. The Rehnquist Court, however,
seems to embody a less rigorous commitment to institutional restraint; indeed, it has begun to show signs of an aggressive judicial activism-an activism seemingly undertaken, in part, to revitalize the once intense regard for
and consideration of personal property and economic rights, an esteem that
had been quiescent for many years.
III.
Predicting the future development of a particular academic field or societal institution is never easy. In constitutional jurisprudence, the task is exacerbated by three factors: (1) the Court is faced with issues that are generally
complex and multifaceted; (2) the Court is constrained to address only those
issues brought before it; and (3) the Court is composed of nine individuals
with diverse educational backgrounds and political ideals, a majority of
whose views represent the final interpretation of the supreme law of the land.
Nonetheless, the hard row must be hoed, if attorneys are to fulfill, competently, their obligations to their clients to exert some influence on the future
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
48. Ely, supra note 10, at 11.
49. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
50. Ely, supra note 10, at 15-16 (quoting A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
68, 109 (1962)).
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content of constitutional provisions and, in general, advance the work of the
Court.
The doctrine of stare decisis, of course, acts as a powerful restriction on
the ability of judges to depart radically from the framework established by
preceding judges. The current Supreme Court, then, is not free to disregard
totally the work of the Warren Court in identifying and securing fundamental rights to personal liberties, defined in terms of natural law. In fact, fidelity to precedent has often been associated with conservative theories of
judicial legitimacy. In this context, I would not be surprised if you viewed
with some skepticism a prediction that conservative judges will undertake an
activist agenda and fundamentally alter the existing framework of natural
law jurisprudence. I hope to dispel any skepticism that you may have, however, by outlining one of the possible scenarios by which the evolution of
natural law jurisprudence could occur. This outline will include a discussion
of recent decisions in which the early groundwork for the transformation has
been laid and will explore the possible coalitions that could arise between
proponents of different conservative judicial doctrines to support such a
transformation.
Largely due to institutional pressures to remain faithful to precedent, the
evolution of natural law theory as a defender of property rights will, I think,
be slow and deliberate. In addition, each incremental movement in the direction of redefining natural law will be subtle and difficult to isolate. Even
at this early stage, however, it is possible to identify a distinct trend: the
Rehnquist Court has retreated from the willingness of previous Courts seriously to consider the possibility that a fundamental right may exist to enjoy
a particular personal liberty, when that right is not expressly articulated in
the Constitution. Interestingly, the first step in the debate that has emerged
between the opposing factions concerning the existence of these rights has
centered on the problem of how to define which right is at issue. Simply by
rephrasing the issue raised for the Court's consideration, a conservative majority is now able to deny the existence of a fundamental right where, were
the issue framed differently, the Court would be bound by precedent to recognize the constitutionally protected nature of the liberty interest. Two recent cases, Bowers v. Hardwick5 and DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services,52 illustrate the Court's tactical retreat from
the recognition of fundamental rights in personal liberties.
In Bowers v. Hardwick the Court was asked to evaluate the constitutionality of a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy. 53 The case came before the
Court on a challenge by Hardwick, who had been arrested and charged with
violating the Georgia statute by engaging in an act of sodomy with a consenting adult male in the bedroom of Hardwick's home. Although Hardwick was a gay male being prosecuted for engaging in homosexual activity,
the statute was written in a gender neutral fashion and, on its face, criminal51. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
52. 57 U.S.L.W. 4218 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1989).
53. 478 U.S. at 188.
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ized any act of sodomy without regard to the gender, sexual orientation, or
54
marital status of the persons who wished to engage in such acts.
The expansive wording of the Georgia statute, and the obvious possibility
that it could be enforced to prevent married couples from engaging in consensual acts of sodomy in the privacy of their home, meant that Bowers
presented an easy issue to many legal scholars who had observed the development of the right to privacy. 55 The Court's previous cases refining the
liberty interests protected by the right to privacy had developed along two
lines. 56 First, the Court had recognized that the right to privacy protects an
57
individual's liberty to make certain decisions free from state interference.
Second, this right shielded the individual in his or her actions in certain
places, regardless of what those particular actions may have been. 58 The
substance of these complementary concepts of privacy has been consistently
premised on invocations of natural law. In Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,59 where the Court invalidated portions of
an "Abortion Control" statute, 6 0 Justice Stevens said, in concurrence, that
"the concept of privacy embodies the 'moral fact that a person belongs to
himself and not others nor to society as a whole.' "61 The Court has also
said that the liberties entitled to constitutional protection under the penumbral right to privacy are among "the basic civil rights of man."' 62 As the
Seventh Circuit has noted, "[tihe character of the Court's language in these
cases brings to mind the origins of the American heritage of freedom-the
abiding interest in individual liberty that makes certain state intrusions on
63
the citizen's right to decide how he will live his own life intolerable."
54. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1981) (recodified at GA. CODE. ANN. § 26-2002 (1987)).
In fact, John and Mary Doe, a married couple, were also plaintiffs in the initial action. The
Does alleged that they wished to engage in activity proscribed by the statute in the privacy of
their home, but that "they had been 'chilled and deterred' from engaging in such activity by
the existence of the statute and Hardwick's arrest." 478 U.S. at 188 n.2. The district court
dismissed the Does' claim for lack of standing. Id.
55. See Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 210 (1986) ("[In Bowers v. Hardwick] the
Court departed from the broader rationale that had supported its privacy decisions in the past
two decades: the protection of individual autonomy and dignity in the making of intimate
decisions."); cf. Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 738-39 (1989) ("To
those who imagined that the privacy doctrine could be explained by reference to [an intuition
or tacit agreement that sexuality is an area of life into which the state has no business intruding], Bowers v. Hardwick has startlingly revealed the inadequacy of their position." (footnotes
omitted)).
56. See 478 U.S. at 203-04 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57. Id.; see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 479 (1965).
58. 478 U.S. at 203-04; see, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715-16 (1984);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1980); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261-62
(1960).
59. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
60. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3201-19 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1989).
61. 476 U.S. at 777 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHHl..
& PUB. AFFAIRS 288-89 (1977)).
62. 381 U.S. at 484-85, 502.
63. Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976), cited in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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Given the precedential power of the fundamental right to make intimate decisions in the privacy of one's home free from state intrusion, the outcome of
the Bowers case seemed almost pre-ordained.
A majority of the Court, however, articulated a significantly narrower perception of the issue raised in Bowers.64 The Court asked, in evaluating the
gender-neutral Georgia sodomy statute, whether any of the Court's prior
formulations of the right to privacy "would extend a fundamental right to
homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy." '65 Having so defined
the issue, the Court was able to acknowledge and pay tribute to the substantial body of privacy cases and still determine that the conduct proscribed by
66
the Georgia statute was not protected by the fundamental right of privacy.
An apparently thorough search of traditional values and the moral underpinnings of a civilized society convinced the Court that a right to engage in
homosexual sodomy is neither "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition" 67 nor " 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "68 More
forcefully, Chief Justice Burger said, in concurrence, that "[t]o hold that the
act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right
would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching." 69 Of course, given the
Court's formulation of the right at issue, this conclusion is hardly surprising.
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
joined in dissent, took immediate and aggressive issue with the majority's
formulation of the central issue raised in Bowers. 70 The first paragraph of
the dissenting opinion exhorted that "[t]his case is no more about a 'fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy' ... than Stanley v. Georgia
was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies .... Rather, this
case is about 'the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let alone.' ,,7' As Justice Blackmun
further explained, "[a] fair reading of the statute and of the complaint
clearly reveals that the majority has distorted the question this case
presents."' 72 Justice Blackmun emphasized the powerful effect that the formulation of the interest at stake has on the evaluation of whether the constitutional right of privacy embraces specific conduct when he said: "The
Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court really has refused
to recognize is the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling
''73
the nature of their intimate associations with others.
In rejecting Hardwick's claim the Court also set the tone for future de*k
64. 478 U.S. at 191.
65. Id. at 192.
66. Id. at 190-91.
67. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
68. Id. at 191 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
69. Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
70. Id. at 199.
71. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
72. Id. at 200.
73. Id. at 206.
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sions by announcing that it was not "inclined to take a more expansive view
of [its] authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due
Process Clause" and that "[t]here should be ...great resistance to expand
the substantive reach of [the due process clause], particularly if it requires
7 4
redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental."
The Court's explicit reluctance to remain faithful to the Warren Court's
expansive framework for analyzing fundamental rights resurfaced this term
in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.7 5 In
DeShaney the majority and dissent once again disagreed vehemently about
the correct formulation of the issue before the Court. 76 In this case, the
court was asked to determine whether the State of Wisconsin deprived fouryear-old Joshua DeShaney of his fourteenth amendment liberty interest by
failing to provide him with adequate protection against the violence of his
custodial father. 77 The lawsuit was brought by Joshua's noncustodial
mother. The mother presented evidence that the Winnebago County Department of Social Services had been repeatedly informed by family members, doctors, and emergency room personnel that Joshua might be the
victim of child abuse inflicted by his father. Notwithstanding numerous reports over a period of two years, the Department took no action to remove
Joshua from his father's home. Eventually, Joshua was so brutally beaten by
his father that he slipped into a life-threatening coma and suffered severe and
irreversible brain damage.
This case again presented a dramatic example of how the manner in which
a court chooses to formulate the interest at stake can virtually pre-ordain its
answer to the question of whether the Constitution safeguards that interest.
The majority in DeShaney addressed the issue of whether the language of the
due process clause required the state to protect the life, liberty, and property
of its citizens against invasion by private actors.7 8 Previous Courts, of
course, have advanced a consistent, if not universally accepted, 7 9 position
that the due process clauses create no general right to the affirmative provision of basic governmental services. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the
majority in DeShaney concluded that Wisconsin had not infringed Joshua's
constitutionally protected liberty interests when it failed to protect him from
80
his father's violence.
74. Id. at 194-95.
75. 57 U.S.L.W. 4218 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1989).
76. Id. at 4222.
77. Id. at 4218.
78. Id. at 4219. The DeShaney court held that "nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens
against invasion by private actors." Id.
79. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 15-9, at 1336 ("Emerging notions that government has an affirmative obligation somehow to provide at least a minimally decent subsistence
with respect to the most basic human needs . . .thus fit quite naturally into a conception of
bodily integrity in which a governmental omission can be as deadly as the most pointed of
governmental acts."); see also Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One
View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 11lU. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973) (arguing in favor of constitutional right for all citizens to the minimal entitlements required to fulfill basic wants).
80. 57 U.S.L.W. at 4221.
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The dissent, however, again argued with the majority's interpretation of
the right at stake. 8 1 And, as Justice Brennan said, "[t]his is more than a
quibble over dicta; it is a point about perspective, having substantive ramifications."' 82 The dissent portrayed Wisconsin's role in Joshua's tragedy as
one of action, not of inaction, and concluded that, because Wisconsin undertook positive efforts to protect abused children like Joshua, once the state
became aware that he was the victim of violence, it had an affirmative duty
to take reasonable measures to ensure his safety. Under this formulation,
the question of whether Joshua had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in Wisconsin's protective services was easily answered in the
83
affirmative.
As the Bowers and DeShaney cases illustrate, the ability of courts to manipulate the definition of the question raised in any given lawsuit empowers
the Court to expand or constrict existing understandings of fundamental
rights. All the while, the Court is ostensibly able to remain faithful to precedent and search its understanding of natural law in a manner consistent
with previous opinions. It is this power, exercised by a conservative majority, that is serving to truncate the work of the Warren Court, and is setting
the stage for the emergence of property rights and economic interests as preeminent in the Court's conception of fundamental law.
In order to prove my prediction accurate, however, the Rehnquist Court
will have to advance beyond merely restricting the continued development of
fundamental rights in personal liberty. That is, it will be necessary for the
Court to emphasize the constitutionally protected status of economic and
property rights, employing the framework of natural law and fundamental
rights. Given the dissonance that reigns among the various judicial theories
that are labeled "conservative," one might wonder how such a development
could occur. As you might have surmised, I have a theory as to how these
factions are likely to come together in a somewhat uneasy coalition, which
may well result in many plurality decisions.
In order fully to explain how this coalition might develop, I must first
define for you what I mean when I refer to various conservative theories of
constitutional interpretation. The first theory, originalism, has been most
vocally supported by Robert Bork, the recently rejected Supreme Court
nominee. 84 According to originalists, the only legitimate basis for constitutional law-making is to ascertain the intentions of those who drafted, proposed, and ratified the Constitution and its amendments. 85 Knowing that
the framers approached the document in the social contractarian manner of
the eighteenth century has in no way daunted the originalists. These dogmatists are convinced that the framers' intent is present, to be gleaned from
81. Id. at 4222.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 4222-23.
84. See Bork, The Constitution, OriginalIntent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 823 (1986) [hereinafter Bork, The Constitution];Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26
S. TEX. L.J. 383 (1985).
85. Bork, The Constitution, supra note 84, at 826.
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careful scrutiny of the document; further, in undertaking such an enterprise,
they appear committed to the notion that the framers could have intended
that a singular meaning be taken from the text. The scholarly tradition of
the time, however, was decidedly anti-interpretive and firmly rooted in the
common law. 86 Nothing in the document, its history, or the early history of
the Supreme Court suggests that the framers intended anything other than
that the words had their own intrinsic meaning; and if interpretation was
called for, it was for the judge to decide what the meaning was, regardless of
what the authors may have intended. As Jefferson Powell has said, "[t]he
relationship of modern intentionalism to this early interpretive theory is
' '8 7
purely rhetorical.
The second theory, judicial self-restraint, is advanced thoughtfully by
Judge Richard Posner. 88 The theory of judicial self-restraint holds that a
judge should include, as an important goal of his constitutional decisionmaking, the desire not to enlarge the power of the judiciary at the expense of
any other government institution. 89 As Judge Posner points out, this formulation of constitutional interpretation is inherently neither liberal nor conservative in the political sense. 90 Rather, it will produce liberal or
conservative outcomes depending on the political orientation of the other
institutions.9 1 After eight years of the conservative agenda of the Reagan
administration, and facing the prospect of at least four more with President
Bush, it is difficult to deny that judges who adopt this posture in contemporary America can rightly be referred to as conservative. Proponents of judicial self-restraint can also be defined in contrast to those jurists and scholars
who view the court as the legitimate counter-majoritarian force in our
democracy.
The third conservative approach to constitutional interpretation is the libertarian theory. This voice from the right calls for judicial activism in the
name of property and economic rights, and is represented by such scholars
as Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago 92 and Steven Macedo of
Harvard University. 93 Epstein builds his libertarian theory on a "corrected"
reading of John Locke, whose philosophical insights undeniably pervade the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. 94 According to Epstein,
an appropriately revised reading of Locke's theory of property entitlements
leads to a textual interpretation of the Constitution that justifies only minimal state intrusion into privately held property and, in particular, severely
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See Powell, supra note 23, at 888.
Id. at 948.
See Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1 (1983).
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
Id.

92. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DoMAIN (1985).

93. S. MACEDO, supra note 21.
94. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 92, at 11. This discussion of taking's jurisprudence draws

heavily from Note, RichardEpstein on the Foundationsof Takings Jurisprudence,99 HARV. L.
REV. 791 (1986).
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restricts the state's authority to institute redistributive policies. 95
The final conservative theory of the judicial role is the law and economics
school. In considering alternative legal rules and policy options, the law and
economics school seeks to determine their ultimate effects upon personal incentives and distribution of income. To make their findings, these jurists
employ economic analyses as their tools. This approach is less often applied
to constitutional interpretation than to common law or statutory decisionmaking. Nonetheless, its proponents advocate a heightened respect for private property and economic interests that may impel them to ally themselves
with certain conservative constitutional doctrinaires.
At first it may be difficult to visualize the manner in which these conservative theories will merge in pursuit of an identifiable political agenda. For
instance, it should be obvious that the school of judicial self-restraint will
clash irreconcilably with the libertarians, whenever the majoritarian institutions act to restrict property interests or economic rights. In addition, it is
not difficult to envision originalists disagreeing with Epstein, if they are unconvinced that the ratifiers were proponents of his version of Lockean political theory. Moreover, the insistence by the states on the inclusion of a Bill
of Rights in the Constitution seems to pit the originalists firmly against advocates of judicial self-restraint.
A more focused analysis of these conservative theories, however, reveals a
possible common ground. As we have seen, libertarian theorists advocate
the reemergence-in the manner of Lochner-of active judicial scrutiny of
the substance of economic legislation. According to Macedo, an articulate
and eloquent advocate of the libertarian position, the natural law concepts
that lie at the heart of the Court's privacy cases compel active judicial protection of economic and property interests. 96 Macedo advances economic
security and property rights as shields for "some of the deepest and most
valuable aspects of free human existence." '9 7 He applauds Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers as a recognition of the link between the fundamental
right to personal privacy and an individual's economic rights, by emphasizing the fact that the challenged conduct occurred in Hardwick's home. 98 In
this manner, Macedo focuses the natural law inquiry on the importance of
possessions, while Blackmun himself might have highlighted the opportunity
for repose and freedom from intrusion that the physical structure of a house
provides.
Originalists easily follow the libertarian lead if the former accept Epstein's
theory of the pervasive influence of Lockean philosophy on the construction
and ratification of the Constitution. The Constitution undeniably exalts, to
some extent, private property interests over some interests in personal liberties and over many majoritarian considerations. 99 Article 1, section 10, of
95.
96.
97.
98.

See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 92, at 11-16, 295-303, 322.
See S. MACEDO, supra note 21, at 82-92.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 78.
99. As Professor Tribe points out: "Many of the Framers believed that preservation of
economic rights was the central purpose of Civil government." L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 15-
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the Constitution provides that no state shall enact any law impairing the
obligations of contracts. Moreover, the fifth and fourteenth amendments
prevent both federal and state governments from taking private property for
public use without paying just compensation. Each of these constitutional
provisions were interpreted in the Lochner era, using invocations of natural
rights, to protect property and economic interests. It is indeed true that
Locke was the first political theorist to assert that the traditional common
law rights to life, liberty, and estate were actually universal human rights
that existed prior to the formation of a civil government.l°° If originalists
ignore the fact that Locke's tenets constituted a theory of revolution based
on the moral and political limits of legislative legitimacy and not a theory of
constitutional interpretation, then they could firmly establish an alliance
with the libertarians.
The role of judicial self-restraint theory in this conservative alliance requires little explication. The current political trend to reduce tax burdens
and restrict federal and state spending on social welfare programs is just one
example of the contemporary political climate that favors the security of
property rights and economic interests. If the majority of the population is
inclined to pursue a political agenda that defers to private property interests,
then proponents of judicial self-restraint are also likely to ally themselves
with the libertarian and originalist judges. Furthermore, the jurists who advocate a limited role for judicial review are likely to exhibit strong support
for majoritarian decisions that restrict personal freedoms, advancing the
agenda that I previously illustrated with Bowers and Deshaney.
I should note that these prophecies are not the product of aimless, abstract
speculation. Rather, the groundwork for future conservative activism, in
the name of natural rights, to advance property and economic interests is
being laid by conservative judges today. In a recent Seventh Circuit opinion,
Judge Posner remained true to his ideal of judicial self-restraint and upheld
an interpretation of an Illinois regulation that bars psychologists from membership on medical staffs of state-regulated hospitals.' 0 ' Plaintiffs had
claimed that the interpretation constituted a denial of equal protection and
substantive due process. Although the court rejected both claims, Judge
Posner could not help pointing out that precedent, rather than his own logic,
mandated his decision. 10 2 Posner said that Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, Inc. 103 controlled the court's decision, "whatever we might personally think of the Court's Manichaean conception of 'personal' versus
'economic' rights ....,,104 Posner went on to quote at length from dicta
included in the Supreme Court's 1972 Lynch decision.' 0 5 As Judge Posner
13, at 1373 n.l (emphasis in original) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J.Madison); I
RECORDS

OF THE

FEDERAL

CONVENTION

533 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (statement of

Gouverneur Morris)).
100. See Grey, supra note 11, at 860.
101. See Illinois Psychological Ass'n v.Falk, 818 F.2d 1337, 1344 (7th Cir. 1987).
102. Id. at 1314.
103. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
104. 818 F.2d at 1341.
105. Id.; see Lynch v.Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
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quoted it, that opinion seemed to elevate the status of property rights to a
plane level with that of personal rights. 10 6 In that case, the Court said, "the
dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one ....
[A] fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty
and the personal right in property .... That rights in property are basic civil
rights has long been recognized."'10 7 This language foreshadows the prominent place that natural law theory will have in the future judicial activism of
a conservative age.
IV.
This exploration of the possible development of constitutional law brings
us back to the question I originally presented: How can the Constitution be
interpreted legitimately and guarantee fundamental rights within existing
constraints? I contend that the current conservative agenda, which employs
natural rights methodology in the service of protecting property rights and
economic interests, shares a common flaw with the Lochner methodologythey both ignore the most basic concern of rights decision-making, the protection of human dignity.
In their attack on the Warren Court, the new conservatives have gone so
far as to say that the rights identified by it are simply not fundamental, from
any principled posture. Instead, the more avid critics would substitute their
own laundry list of protected freedoms, focusing primarily on economic liberties and property rights, or would strip the Constitution of its prophylactic
purpose for any right not expressly articulated therein. Both of these approaches suffer from the methodological flaws that I illustrated previously.
Specifically, neither can articulate a principled reason for preferring their list
of fundamental values over others, nor for abdicating the judiciary's role as
interpreter of such value laden, yet vague, terms as "liberty" and "due process." Moreover, it seems absurd to assert that the meaning of some of our
Constitution's most critical provisions can be intelligibly discerned without
"a substantial injection of content from some source beyond the documentary language and the discoverable intentions of those who wrote and ratified
it.' 0 8 The recognition that the judicial task is necessarily a normative one is
not to say, in the words of John Hart Ely, " that all bets are off, that we are
therefore free to make the Constitution mean whatever we please. '"0 9
Rather, we must examine the purposes that underlie the protection of each
right that is offered, by either conservative or liberal activists, as an appropriate candidate for the preferred status of fundamental right.
The list of fundamental personal rights elucidated by the Warren Court,
and protected from the Warren years on, is impressive but incomplete. They
include the rights to expression, association, education, academic freedom,
106.
107.
108.
109.

818 F.2d at 1341.
405 U.S. at 552.
Ely, supra note 10, at 5.
Id.
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privacy of the home, and personal autonomy."10 Why, it may be asked, have
such rights as the right to a job, to food, or to housing not been included? It
is clear that, for a large portion of the American public, the right to job
security, affordable shelter, and minimal nutritional and medical provisions
are essential for the development and enrichment of the personal liberties
currently protected under the rubric of economic rights. Thus, as Professor
Tribe stated, "[i]n giving satisfactory content to the idea of personhood, it
will not do to draw a bright line between 'economic' and 'civil' liberties, or
between 'property' rights and 'personal' rights," as this distinction "overlooks the importance of property and contract in protecting the dispossessed
... 'I John Hart Ely has scathingly suggested that "[t]he danger that
upper middle class judges and commentators will find upper middle class
values fundamental is obviously present irrespective of methodology." 1 2
The basic interdependence of economic and personal rights, coupled with
the growing tendency of the Court to make a fetish of economic rights,
should be examined critically. For despite the fact that government participation in the economic lives of individuals is, as the Court says, "pervasive"
and "deep,"' 13 originalists, majoritarians, and law and economics advocates
would strip away constraints on the so-called free-market. While this position protects property rights, it reflects scant regard for the welfare of those
persons with little money or other significant assets. Unreflective constitutional protection of the right to rent one's property to the highest bidding
tenant and the right to close one's factory without regard for the welfare of
its workers are examples of what can be expected, if this program is adopted.
It has been asserted that the position that the Constitution provides protection of absolute dominion over one's property for the sake of dominion
alone contains no compelling moral argument. Countermanding this agenda
is the mission of such personal rights activists as Justice Brennan himself,
who feels that "hundreds of thousands of American[s] live entire lives without real prospect of the dignity and autonomy that ownership of real property could confer. Protection of the human dignity [and autonomy of those
without property] requires a much modified view of the proper relationship
of individual and state."' '14 As Chief Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey
Supreme Court said in State v. Shack,' 15 "[p]roperty rights serve human
values. They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it.' 16 It is thus
possible to be critical of the shared but distinct methodologies of the Warren
and neoconservative Courts, and still assert that the decisions of one were
right and the other wrong. The interpretive process of the Court must be
relied on to be self-corrective to some degree. In fact, some judge or justice
will doubtless point out, before long, that Judge Posner's interpretation of
110. Id. at 37.
Ill. L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 15-13, at 1373-74.
112. Ely, supra note 10, at 38 n.142.
113. Brennan, supra note 7, at 11.

114. Id.
115. 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
116. 277 A.2d at 372.
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the quotation from Lynch v. Household Finance Corporation11 7 was actually
not quite true to its intended meaning.1 18 For, instead of asserting that economic rights were equally as valuable as personal rights, the Court was actually reiterating its opinion that enjoyment of property rights is "an essential
pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which
the [Fourteenth] Amendment was intended to guarantee." ' 19
This is where Justice Brennan's concept of interpretive legitimacy comes
into play. Supreme Court decisions will continue to be value-laden, particularly in those cases where the Court is asked to breathe life into otherwise
inert phrases. However, there will be no assurance that the Court's understanding will evolve, I maintain, unless it asks itself the right questions.
When faced with the issue of whether to recognize a fundamental right in
economic liberty or property possession, the Court must ask itself" for what
human purpose-to what end-should these property rights be recognized
as constitutionally protected?" In this regard, I suggest that the views of
Judge Wright should be considered:
Questions about what "liberty" and "equality" mean, which is after all
what both the Lochner and the Warren Courts were attempting to answer, are the very heart of our Constitution. Recognizing that the very
heart of our Constitution is contested and contestable entails ... 20 that
"the ultimate test of the Justices' work ... must be goodness."'

As advocates, it will be the task of many of you here to formulate the
questions, in order to guide the courts; and to serve society by advancing the
development of a principled constitutional philosophy of personal rights,
along with the economic liberty necessary to ensure those rights. In that
endeavor, you have my most earnest hopes and sincere best wishes.

117. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 105-107.

119. 405 U.S. at 544.
120. Wright, supra note 6, at 522.

